Abstract
INTRODUCTION

I n Showdown at Gucci Gulch
, chronicling the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the issues of state and local tax preferences are front and center. The lobbying effort to remove from the Administration's proposal the repeal of state and local tax deductions was "one of the most persistent and pervasive lobbying campaigns of the tax reform story" (p. 113). That effort succeeded in preserving, in this watershed tax reform, the full deduction in the House, and all but the sales tax deduction in the Senate. The fi nal proposal eliminated the sales tax deduction, but in 2004 the deduction was restored as an option to the income tax deduction.
In addition, tax exemption for state and local bonds "was one of the most intensely lobbied parts of the tax bill" (p. 137). The debate, however, was not about the general exemption, but the alarming growth in private activity bonds, which, despite previously enacted restrictions, had surged to twothirds of the bond market. And even in this case, numerous carve-outs for many types of activities, as well as capped small issue bonds, remained. Although private activity bonds were included in the minimum tax, the general tax exempt preference was not. As the tax reform drama played out, we saw the federal government as protective of the states' tax benefi ts and slow to react even when these benefi ts were being abused-an indulgent approach. At the same time, as we show in the following discussion, in many cases federal tax revisions have taken place with consequences for the states, but with little attention to states' concerns.
In order to review both the ways in which federal tax policy affecting the states is made and how important those effects are, it is useful to sort the interaction between federal tax policy and state and local government activity into four broad categories. The fi rst is the explicit preferences granted state and local governments in the federal tax law. The second is indirect effects on the costs of fi nancing state and local activities from apparently unrelated tax provisions. The third is how tax changes interact with the states' desires to conform their tax systems to the federal system to simplify administration and compliance of their own tax systems. Finally, there are federal restrictions on state tax policy; recent provisions are tracked by the Congressional Budget Offi ce under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Following the discussion of these interactions, the concluding section discusses implications for the attitudes of federal policymakers towards state and local governments in formulating tax policy and the outlook for future changes.
EXPLICIT PREFERENCES IN TAX LAW
The deduction for state and local taxes and exemption of interest on tax exempt bonds have been in the income tax since its beginning and together constitute the main tax expenditures for state and local activity in the federal income tax. As shown in Table 1 , out of the $80 billion of offi cial tax expenditures associated with state and local governments, slightly over Note: Tax expenditures are from Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT, 2006a) . The tax expenditures for income and personal property taxes were allocated based on the relative size of deduction on tax returns in the latest tax data (2004, http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/article/0..id=96987.00.html). The tax expenditure for sales taxes is from JCT (2006b), which restored the expired sales tax provision (http://www. housr.gov/jct/pubs06.html). The corporate tax expenditure estimate is explained in the text. The state estate tax credit was from the 2001 estate tax fi le, and the credit was from Internal Revenue Service (http://www.irs. ustreas.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0..id=96442.00.html). The cost of exempting state and local government enterprises from tax was based on estimates for electric utilities, and the assumption that the tax benefi t relative to receipts was the same across other government enterprises (Congressional Budget Offi ce, 2005 , 2007 .
half (55 percent) are itemized deductions for state and local taxes, and virtually all of the remainder are with tax exempt bond interest. (Note that it is not strictly correct to add the preferences, particularly for itemized deductions, because of interactions.) The tax expenditure list allocates these expenditures by functional category and does not classify the property tax or the exemptions for interest on private activity bonds as supporting state and local government activity. Two additional items, not in the offi cial tax expenditure list, could be considered subsidies. One is the deduction from the federal income tax base for state and local corporate income taxes, estimated at approximately $20 billion. If corporate income tax deductions were considered a preference, and a case can be made for doing so, the cost would rise by $20 billion, to $100 billion, with tax deductions accounting for almost two-thirds of the total.
The second item that could be considered an income tax expenditure is the exemption from income tax of the profi ts of state and local business enterprise. These activities are also activities undertaken by the for-profi t sector. The Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO) has estimated, for FY 2002, sales of $287 billion associated with these enterprises (CBO, 2005) . The largest share of these sales is for hospitals (23 percent), higher education (21 percent), electric power (19 percent), and water (12 percent). Other activities include gas utilities, lotteries, air transport, solid waste management, parks and recreation, toll highways, liquor stores, special assessments, water transport, and parking. The benefi t of excluding this income from the federal corporate tax is uncertain; CBO (2007) has estimated a revenue gain of $0.8 billion from taxing electric utilities; if this same amount relative to revenue occurred for other business enterprises, the total benefi t would be $4.2 billion. This number may be too large given the capital intensity of electric power production, but may be understated because of direct funding for activities such as higher education. Given the lack of precedent in taxing these activities, the small size of the effect, and the conferring of similar benefi ts on the tax-exempt sector, this area seems one unlikely to be subject to legislation. Nevertheless, CBO (2007) included a provision for taxing state electric utilities, where no non-profi t counterparts exist, in their budget options study.
Prior estate tax law allowed a credit against the federal estate tax, up to a limit, for state death taxes. If the estate tax repeal enacted in 2001 is allowed to expire, the state death tax credit, which was repealed by the end of 2004, would be restored. In 2001, this death tax credit was $6.3 billion. The credit was actually a free ride for the states, since each dollar of the death credit up to the limit in the tax law (and states generally constructed their taxes to conform to those limits) reduced the federal tax dollar for dollar. The current smaller estate tax now has a deduction, which is less valuable because it reduces the tax by taxes paid times the estate tax rate, and many states no longer have a death tax credit.
The repeal of the estate tax and the elimination of the state death tax credit are examples entirely different from the treatment of preferences in the 1986 reform act. In this case, virtually no attention was paid to the implications for the states. Indeed, the state death tax credit was phased out more rapidly than the estate tax itself. On the other hand, a dollar-for-dollar state death tax credit is an extraordinarily generous federal tax provision that involves a direct transfer of federal revenues to the states, limited only by the size of the federal estate tax.
For a variety of reasons, many believe that the complete repeal of the estate tax may not be feasible. In 2006, a number of proposals were made to substitute a much smaller permanent estate tax for the elimination of the estate tax. Interestingly, elimination of the deduction of state death taxes in computing the federal estate tax was also proposed to limit the revenue impact, a case where tax policy makers were pursuing their own interests without retaining any benefi t for the states.
The remainder of this subsection discusses the two major tax preferencesdeductibility of state and local taxes and tax exempt interest-in more detail.
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Tax subsidies for state and local itemized deductions amounted to $44 billion in FY 2007, or about six percent of state and local tax receipts, based on receipts reported in the Economic Report of the President, 2006. The subsidies vary substantially both by tax and by state (and locality). The largest relative subsidy is for individual income taxes, where the tax expenditure is 11 percent of state and local individual income tax collections. For property taxes, the subsidy is much less, four percent, because property taxes also apply to businesses and owners of rental property (where the tax would be deducted as a business expense in any case) as well as owner-occupied homes. The additional benefi t due to the sales tax deduction is less than one percent of sales and gross receipt taxes. This small effect occurs because the current sales tax deduction is allowed as a substitute for income tax deductions and the benefi t is measured as the additional deduction allowed because of this option, which tends to be small. Note that the this argument for counting tax deductions as tax expenditures cannot be as made for property taxes or sales taxes. In measuring income, sales taxes are appropriately deducted as a cost by fi rms, whether corporate or unincorporated, in determining profi t; the subsidy occurs at the individual level when the sales tax is deducted a second time as an itemized deduction by consumers. Property tax deductions by fi rms and landlords are similarly an appropriate deduction because they are a cost that arises before income is determined, and these deductions are not considered subsidies. The property tax deduction for owner-occupied housing is a subsidy, not because of the property tax per se, but because imputed rent is not included in income. Were imputed gross rent to be included in income, the costs would be appropriately deductible. Whether property tax deductions on owner-occupied homes are treated as a subsidy to state and local activities or a subsidy to home ownership is, however, a legitimate question.
Many economists and tax reformers are critical of deductions for state and local taxes. State taxes provide untaxed benefi ts, and an income tax that excludes these payments from the base fails to tax comprehensive income. There is an alternative view, however: that they are mandatory payments and should be deducted on those grounds and that costs and benefi ts do not match closely. The deduction also distorts the level of state and local services and the mix of taxes and fees. Thus, there are two very different types of issues surrounding the deductibility of state and local taxes: those of fairness in the distribution, and those of incentives.
These tax deductions reduce both revenue and the progressivity of the income tax, but, assuming the rate structure could be adjusted to offset these effects as was the case in 1986, to many the important equity issue is the disparate treatment of taxpayers in different states. Although itemized deductions are taken by 35 percent of taxpayers overall, the share itemizing varies substantially across the states (Maguire, 2006) . In 2004, the shares itemizing varied from almost 50 percent in Maryland to 17 percent in West Virginia. Only Maryland had a share above 45 percent, but eight states and the District of Columbia had shares of 40 percent to 45 percent. Of the nine states without a broad income tax, only three (Nevada, New Hampshire, and Washington) were among the states with a share above the average, and all of those fell into the 35 percent to 40 percent itemizing. Reuben (2005) , studying the issue using data from 2002 before the sales tax option was added, concludes that itemization occurs at higher rates with states with high income and wealth and progressive income taxes. These characteristics persist with the sales tax deduction. According to data in Maguire (2006) , only a third of states without an income tax had an itemization rate above the average, while over one-half of those with an income tax did. Thus, even with the optional sales tax deduction in place, having an income tax made itemization more likely.
The addition of the sales tax deduction, which was extended but remains temporary, primarily benefi ted taxpayers in the states without an income tax (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming). These states only accounted for half of the sales tax deductions claimed, but many are small states, and in the case of other states with an income tax, the net benefi t (in excess of the income tax option) is likely small.
One policy concern is that the deduction increases the size of the state and local sector by reducing the state and local tax burden for itemizers. At the same time, some applaud the preferences for income taxes and property taxes, which tend to be more progressive than sales taxes, and even with the sales tax option, the deduction of income taxes dominates the deduction for sales taxes ($202 billion in income taxes compared to $19 billion in sales taxes in 2004). Arguments are also made that federal deductibility mutes distortions in interstate location decisions as a result of differential taxes. While there are concerns that the deduction infl uences the magnitude of the state and local sector and the mix of taxes, most studies fi nd mixed effects. The two most recent studies, Stotsky (1990) and Courant and Gramlich (1990) , like most of the previous ones (which they reviewed), tend to fi nd modest effects. Reuben (2005) points out that no state lowered its sales tax rates after the 1986 revision eliminating deductibility and 15 states had a higher sales tax rate in 1989 than in 1985. No state without an income tax introduced one to substitute for sales tax revenues. However, an argument has been made that the lowering of marginal tax rates was a more serious reduction in the value of income tax deductions than of state and local tax deductions because income taxes were more important for the high-income taxpayers with the largest rate reductions (Stark, 2004) . Chirinko and Wilson (2005) review the evidence on interstate substitution, which suggests limited effects of state and local tax differentials on location decisions. These results may suggest to federal tax policy makers that the deduction has no signifi cant distorting effects on states' mix or level of taxes, and should not be an important issue in the consideration of these policies. Concern may instead be directed at equity issues and, if so, the likelihood of retaining the sales tax deduction appears high.
Equity issues may also factor in a number of legislative proposals. Arguments have been made that the elimination of state and local tax deductibility is a good offset for eliminating the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), where the major preference is the state and local tax deduction, and the reach of the AMT will increase dramatically without legislative change that is costly in revenue loss. Such proposals were explored by Reuben (2005) and in recent simulations by Burman, Gale, Leiserson, and Rohaly (2007) . The President's Advisory Panel's (2005) tax reform proposals proposed to eliminate the deduction along with the AMT. A different approach to addressing inequities across the states was taken by Senator Ron Wyden and Congressman Rahm Emmanuel, who proposed replacing the itemized deduction with a credit for state and local taxes available to all taxpayers in their comprehensive tax reform proposal, introduced in the Senate as S. 1111.
Tax Exempt Bonds
State and local issuance of debt has been going on virtually throughout the existence of the republic. (The history discussed in this section is based on Zimmerman (1991).) Throughout the early to mid 1800s, state public debt began increasing. States turned more and more to aiding private developers. With the industrial revolution, railroad development was actively sought by state and local governments, to the point of serious fi scal problems by 1837. Indeed, the sharp increases in debt issued to aid private developers along with the depression sparked a multitude of restrictions, generally restrictions against lending to private individuals and corporations, and debt limits on general obligation bonds that continue to this day. However, with the limitations came numerous methods for avoidance such as special districts, special funds, and public authorities.
These concerns all seemed to stem from fears over state fi scal collapse, not from the overlap of state and federal government tax authorities. In fact, prior to the civil war there was no federal income tax, making the question of tax-exempt bonds a moot point. Although many advocates of exemption status may note, and use, a fi rst instance of the concept of intergovernmental tax immunity with Justice Marshall's 1819 decision and statement "the power to tax involves the power to destroy," this famous claim actually referred to the states ability to tax an instrument of the federal government.
While there were repeated attempts after ratifi cation of the 16 th amendment in 1913 to remove tax-exempt bonds in their entirety, it was not until after World War II that there was ever a discussion of limiting the particular use of tax exempt bonds. Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight marked the fi rst attempt to restrict state uses of tax exempt bonds. The 1968 Congress began by limiting industrial development bonds (IDBs) and arbitrage bonds in response to a growth of bonds issued for private purposes. In fact, the limits on IDBs began the fi rst qualifi ed private activity bonds. Congress set the future trend not by defining public purpose but rather by defi ning what was not. The 1968 restrictions outlined the still-current two-part use and security test of a private activity bond, although at the time the use and security tests required 25 percent or more of the use or securities to be private. This test is a test for "bad" bonds, that is, if the share is greater than 25 percent the bond passes the test for a taxable bond. This and later restrictions were met with an onslaught from the states to exempt specifi c activities. For example, transition rules were added, in part to acquiesce to congressional pressures on behalf of their states, which included "exceptions to tax-exempt-bond-limits for a new stadium for the Miami Dolphins football team, a convention center in Miami Beach, a midtown Miami redevelopment project, and two new heating and cooling systems for the Florida Region" (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, p. 147) .
The states' pleas that were met as private activities qualifying for tax exempt status continued to include residential property; sports facilities; facilities for convention or trade show; airports; docks, wharves, parking facilities, and mass commuting facilities; and other waste, pollution, and utility facilities were allowed to qualify for tax exempt status.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made substantial changes to the exempted facilities and narrowed the use and security tests to ten percent (i.e., ten percent or more of the use or the securities were private). Gold (1990) Despite the federal government's historical relaxation and subsequent constriction of tax exempt municipal bonds, states and local governments have a wide variety of activities that can be fi nanced with tax exempt bonds, particularly government obligation bonds that have few limits. For example, according to the Government Accountability Offi ce (2006), 15 percent of golf courses were owned by state and local governments. Of these, four percent were associated with resort or real estate facilities. In addition, 39 hotels associated with convention centers, airports or golf courses were identifi ed by fi nance experts as being fi nanced with tax-exempt bonds. The report also mentions over 300 government-owned convention centers and cites instances of state and local government support of gaming facilities. Table 2 shows the distribution of bond issuance across broad categories of activities that can be considered private in nature. Of states' bond issues, at least half are for these activities. (Total bond issuances exclude general purpose since there is no reliable way to allocate those bonds to private or public purpose. Bonds issued for general purpose account for roughly a quarter of total bond issuances.) This table also includes tax-exempt, tax-able, and qualifi ed private activity bond issues, which account, respectively, for 85.1 percent, 7.4 percent, and 7.5 percent of total (including general purpose) issuances over the six-year period.
According to Table 1 , above, explicitly private activity bonds account for 23 percent of the tax expenditure for bonds. This number is larger because of the existing stock. As with the property tax deduction, the tax expenditure list classifi es these bonds in functional categories outside state and local activities. Nevertheless, the states and localities play an important role in allocating these resources. While some of the uses in Table 2 could be argued to be traditional functions of state and local governments, convention centers, stadiums and arenas, and other private-entertainment-related activities are questionable.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OTHER FEDERAL TAX POLICIES
State and local governments are also affected indirectly by other tax policies of the federal government. The most obvious are the marginal tax rates themselves. As important, in terms of incentives, as proposals to disallow state and local tax deductions was the fall in the top marginal tax rate from 70 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1986. Although part of this rate reduction was reversed in 1993, with rates then reduced again in 2001, there has been little attention to this effect. Of course, states were hardly in a position to protest the lower rates because these rates benefi ted their taxpayers. Moreover, there may have been little in incentive effects for state and local taxes. These changes affect the benefi ts of interest exclusion for state and local bonds because the value of the exclusion is higher for higher marginal tax rates.
There are several other important tax policy decisions affecting tax burdens on capital income that affect tax exempt borrowing, including the tax rates on corporate source income (the corporate tax rate, capital gains tax rates, and tax rates on dividends), business subsidies, and tax preferred savings provisions. These effects depend on which assets are closer substitutes for municipal bonds.
Consider the corporate tax rate. If interest-bearing assets are much closer substitutes for state and local bonds than equities, the corporate income tax, which might normally be expected to burden competing business investment, could make state and local bond fi nance more costly by driving up the interest rate. Interest is deductible at the corporate level, leading corporations to favor debt fi nance, and their increased demand drives up the interest rate. In fact, debt is actually subsidized at the corporate level because the infl ation premium is also deducted, along with the real interest rate. At the personal tax level, however, equity is favored relative to debt, because of lower capital gains tax rates (due both to deferral and to lower rates during most of the history of the income tax), leading to a shifting of the supply of capital to the corporate sector from debt to equity. High marginal rates at the corporate as well as the individual levels should be associated with higher interest rates, other things equal. In 1986, the lowering of corporate marginal tax rates and the increase in capital gain rates were changes favorable to lower interest rates and, in this scenario, offset somewhat the unfavorable effects of the lower marginal rates on state and local borrowing costs. The higher capital gain rates would also shift supply directly from corporate equities into interest-bearing assets.
Similarly, reduced taxes on capital gains and dividends would also push up interest rates on state and local bond rates by attracting supply from interest bearing assets, along with directly shifting assets from municipal bonds to equities. Such changes have occurred recently: capital gains tax rates were reduced in 1997 and both rates were reduced in 2003.
Subsidies for business investment also attract capital away from state and local bonds for both debt and equity fi nance. Lowering the tax burden on corporate investment in this fashion, unlike lowering corporate tax rates, unambiguously induces a rise in interest rates and a higher return to equity investment, which should cause capital to be shifted away from municipal bonds. These rules have shifted over time. Investment credits were enacted in the 1960s and a particularly generous set of investment subsidies was enacted in 1981 when dramatically accelerated depreciation was adopted, leading to negative effective tax rates even on equity fi nanced business investments. These benefi ts were scaled back somewhat in 1982 and 1984, and contracted signifi cantly in 1986 when the investment credit was repealed and depreciation for structures slowed considerably, and the corporate marginal tax rate lowered.
Another federal tax policy that reduces the benefi ts for tax exempt interest is the favorable tax treatment for retirement savings, which provides a roughly zero tax rate on assets invested in these plans. The deferral of tax on the savings element in life insurance, if allowed over a long period of time, is close to a tax exemption. One proposal in the Advisory Panel's report would have provided a dramatic increase in investment subsidies by moving to a consumption tax base by expensing investment. The Bush administration has proposed in recent years a signifi cant expansion of tax-free savings plans including a generous, no-strings-attached general savings plan that could eventually allow much of savings to be invested in tax-free accounts. This would significantly reduce the value of the exemption for state and local bond interest.
As with marginal tax rate proposals, it is not reasonable to expect the federal government to frame its own tax policy structure based on the impacts on state and local borrowing costs. In some cases, however, different mechanisms could have been used that would have been less harmful to the state and local bond market. For example, in 2003, rather than lower the personal tax on dividends and capital gains, the corporate tax rate could have been lowered. This approach would have reduced the corporate debt subsidy, raising the burden on heavily favored debt investment and lowering it on equities. Such an approach would have likely reduced interest rates in general.
These general equilibrium consequences appear because the federal subsidy for state and local borrowing is in the form of an exemption from tax rather than some explicit subsidy (such as a grant) and, therefore, is affected, as discussed above, by other changes. If the preference were allowed by a credit, the benefi t would not be affected directly by changes in marginal tax rates, and the benefi t could even be adjusted to offset other changes induced by federal policies. State and local governments, however, may reasonably feel that retaining the longstanding exemption provides a more secure grasp on their tax benefi t.
In general, less discussion about these implications for the state and local sector has occurred for these changes than for direct proposals affecting tax exempt bonds or state or local borrowing. However, the link between marginal tax rates and the benefi ts for state and local debt has been recognized in some instances. As the nation was considering raising tax rates to pay for World War II, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau proposed eliminating the tax exemption for both new and outstanding bonds to prevent the windfall from high wartime income tax rates (Zimmerman, 1991, p. 44) . In another example of the recognition of these effects, when the government initially proposed to eliminate the dividend tax, a study by California State Treasurer Phil Angelides (2003) estimated the effect on borrowing costs in the nation to sum to $155 billion over ten years.
Finally, to some extent, federal taxes target the same revenue base as the state and local government sector. Indeed, one of the arguments for deducting state and local income taxes was the possibility that high federal tax rates, particularly in the past, left little room for states to impose such taxes. This issue is less important with the much lower current tax rates, and the evidence that behavioral responses are small. There are other tax bases that are common targets. For example, both the federal and state and local governments impose signifi cant taxes on alcohol and tobacco. For the former, the federal tax is about 5.3 percent of sales, while state and local taxes are 3.8 percent on average (based on revenues and sales data, the latter reported in Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys (2006)). For tobacco, state and local taxes amount to 15.5 percent of sales and 24 percent if the tobacco settlement, which acts as an excise tax, is included, while the federal tax is 8.8 percent. While the demand for these goods is relatively inelastic, the tax of one jurisdiction does reduce the revenues of another. A Senate proposal under consideration as of this time (July, 2007) would raise the federal cigarette tax from the current level of $0.39 per pack to $1 per pack, and an increase is still under consideration. An increase to $1 per pack would involve a 14 percent increase in price, and, at an elasticity of 0.4, would reduce consumption by about 5.5 percent and revenues (including the tobacco settlement) by $1.8 billion. (States that have securitized their tobacco settlements would, however, not be affected.)
STATE TAX CONFORMITY AND TAX ADMINISTRATION
Another way in which federal tax policy affects the states is through the common practice of basing state income taxes on federal defi nitions. Of the 41 states with an individual income tax, only fi ve do not conform to a federal tax measure; nine conform to federal taxable income and the remainder plus the District of Columbia conform to adjusted gross income (Fed-eration of Tax Administrators, 2007) . Conformity may be automatic or may require conforming legislation; as a result, some states conform to past versions of federal law. As shown in Table 3 , most states also conform to federal taxable income for purposes of federal corporate income taxes, but a number do not conform to specifi c major provisions of the federal tax code, including the recently enacted provisions for bonus depreciation in 2002 and the qualifi ed production activities deduction in 2004. The production activities provision allows a deduction against taxable income for fi rms in manufacturing and certain other industries, a deduction that affects the taxable income base as does accelerated depreciation. States may put nonconforming exceptions in their law with respect to both personal and business tax matters. Muntean (2006) discusses, for example, the numerous non-conforming provisions in California's conformity legislation, including health savings accounts and qualifi ed student tuition expenses. Tower and Boyd (2006) suggest that decoupling from federal rules, as well as individual state provisions that do not conform to the federal code, are ubiquitous, identifying 1,666 modifi cations by the states to the federal code, and 530 state initiatives (special state deductions).
Pomp (1987) reviews both the kinds of conformity and the advantages. The advantages of conformity are: (1) tax returns are easier to complete, (2) taxpayers need to keep only one set of tax records, (3) conformity eliminates separate determinations of legal and factual questions, and (4) conformity reduces the burden on tax administrators. He also defi nes three types of conformity. The fi rst is absolute conformity, where state taxes are based on adjusted gross income, taxable income, or tax liability. The second is facial-record-keeping: only information on federal tax returns is needed for the state return. The third is non-facial conformity, which occurs when the state has its own separate tax provision (such as a subsidy for investing in the state). The Tower and Boyd data indicate that state initiatives that produce non-facial conformity are less numerous than the other forms of conformity (530 versus 1,666) but do not provide a breakdown of the 1,666.
General conformity means that when the federal government enacts provisions that expand the tax base, states receive a revenue windfall, and when provisions narrow the tax base, they experience a revenue loss. States could offset these effects either by decoupling from federal changes or by changing their tax rates. Politically speaking, changing the tax rates downward with base broadening is easy, and many states made those changes after the 1986 act (Courant and Gramlich, 1990) . States are presented with greater diffi culties when the base is narrowed, when to conform and maintain revenues requires the politically more diffi cult step of raising tax rates. As a result, many states have decoupled from provisions that result in revenue losses. Occasionally states' actions in this regard seem inexplicable. Muntean (2006) , for example, pointed out that California not only frequently chose different effective dates for conforming legislation, but also did not conform to the tax benefi t adopted in 2004 allowing a deduction for certain fi lm and television productions. As a provision largely aimed at Hollywood, federal policymakers could not be faulted if they reconsidered how important this provision was if the state of California does not consider it so.
In many cases where the federal tax base was narrowed, there were alternative approaches that would not have created conformity problems. For example, the incentives in the temporary bonus depreciation could have been achieved by a credit. Relief to the business sector in 2004 provided through the production activities deduction could have been provided through lower corporate tax New Jersey MARCS may be used for property after July 7, 1993; New York and Oregon MACRS may be used generally for property after 1994; North Dakota allows only form assets after 1983; Pennsylvania requires straight line depreciation for reality. 4 Arkansas, California, DC, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming all limit expense allocation to the pre-JGTRRA amount of $25,000; Arizona also restricts to pre-JGTRRA but adds 20 percent of amounts exceeding the limit for years one through four; Nebraska has the same pre-JGTRRA limit and a 20 percent addition beginning after July 1, 2006; New York excludes sports utility vehicles over 600 pounds. Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin allow depletion except oil and gas wells; Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Tennessee only allow cost depletion; Arizona excepts mining exploration expenses, Maryland exempts oil, and Oregon allows depletion only on metal mines; Colorado has an exception for a 27.5 percent depletion rate for oil shale, Oklahoma has a 22 percent allowance for oil and gas and Kentucky has special provisions for coal royalties. 7 Alabama and Pennsylvania allow deduction on corporate tax only; as noted earlier, Michigan does not have corporate tax, and deduction is allowed on personal income tax; New Jersey deduction is allowed for qualifi ed property produced or manufactured by the taxpayers rates. In each case, there were other reasons that were presumably compelling to lawmakers. In the case of bonus depreciation, a possible reason for choosing the deduction approach was that it was much more complex to restore investment tax credit language than to modify existing depreciation rules. Another possible reason for this choice is that, if the temporary provision was converted to a permanent one, the partial expensing rule was more neutral and a better stepping stone to a possible future shift to a consumption base. In the case of the production activity deduction, there was political pressure to focus as much of the tax benefi t as possible on fi rms that were losing the export subsidy, whose fi nding of illegality by the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the reason for the 2004 legislation. In addition, the slowdown in manufacturing job growth contributed to a focus on providing the benefi t to manufacturing and not to the service and trade sectors. Although many tax professionals criticized the provision on the grounds of adding to tax complexity and economic distortions, these issues may have been more compelling to policymakers. One recent example in which conformity concerns were addressed was the Senate proposal to exclude dividends from federal gross income. Johnson (2003) pointed out that both Senator Nickles, the Budget Committee chairman, and Senator Grassley, the Finance Committee chairman, had pledged to craft language that would not cause a conformity problem. The provision ultimately adopted, however, was the lower rate on dividends originally proposed by the House.
More focus on conformity concerns prior to federal legislative enactment might raise the visibility of this issue, particularly if alternative approaches to accomplish the same goal were proposed that did not create conformity problems. And to the extent that the problem is the political diffi culty in raising tax rates when the federal base is narrowed, more stability in the tax code would be helpful.
Goodman (1995) proposes a more far-reaching proposal: that the federal government and the states agree on a comprehensive common tax base and the federal government, in turn, would collect the state tax and remit it to the states. There would be substantial savings in tax administration as well as compliance by taxpayers and resolution of issues in the courts. But given the experience of other conformity initiatives, such as the streamlined sales tax, such a proposal seems a distant dream.
FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATES AND LOCAL TAXING AUTHORITY AND OTHER TAX-RELATED MANDATES
The final category of federal provisions affecting state and local governments is that federal provisions that could be termed tax-related mandates. While mandates may more commonly be thought of as spending requirements, since 1997, following the passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, federal legislative changes relating to state and local taxes are included in unfunded state mandate lists prepared by the Congressional Budget Offi ce. Most of these provisions involve restrictions on state and local taxing authority. Some restrictions are explicit, such as the federal provision enacted in 1998 and extended in 2001 and 2004, disallowing new taxes on Internet access and multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. This legislation had a complicated set of grandfathering provisions, exceptions, and issues, discussed in detail by Maguire and Noto (2007) . For example, there were concerns that telecommunications via the Internet would be taxed, while those through other forms, such as cable, would not, resulting in an exemption for telecommunications.
This issue was also discussed in conjunction with concerns about sales and use tax collections on interstate sales through the Internet. The limits on the ability of states to collect sales tax from out-of-state sellers derive from court decisions, but proposals have been made, although not enacted, to permit collection for states that adopted the proposals under the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP). The SSTP would provide a uniform base and rate and make compliance by the fi rms easier. Bills introduced in this area (S. 2152 and S. 2153 in the 109 th Congress) have had mixed benefi ts to state and local governments as they also make changes in other telecommunications taxes that might lose revenues.
Another issue related to taxation of out-of-state sellers is allowing states the ability to impose other taxes such as business activity taxes (largely corporate income taxes). Some federal legislation exists on the issue of extending taxes to out-of-state fi rms, dating from 1959 (see discussion in Faber (2006)), which defi ned certain actions that did not constitute nexus for purposes of sales of tangible personal property. Legislation was introduced in the 109 th Congress (H.R. 2956 and H.R. 2721) to extend the treatment restricting nexus for sales of personal property to services and make other specifi c changes .
The issues surrounding remote vendors and Internet sales are complex and beyond the scope of this paper, but one argument made by Mazerov (2001) is that the Internet access tax moratorium signals that Congress will not help with the fundamental problems of sales over the Internet and competition with "Main street" fi rms and will encourage "click and mortar" fi rms that have both regular stores and Internet operations to find ways of avoiding tax.
Federal restrictions were also imposed in 1995 (Faber, 2006) This change resulted in protests by state and local government organizations, particularly the National Association of Counties. Several issues, in addition to a general complaint that this provision was an unfunded mandate, were outlined in a National Association of State Budget Officers (2006) issue brief: administrative costs to the state and local governments, application limited to the public sector, lack of consultation, perceived need arising from a study of federal and not state and local contracts, infl ating bids by three percent to cover additional costs, complexities regarding application to purchasing cards, and lack of detail. Since this provision was a withholding provision, that is, an advance payment of tax rather than a tax increase, the complaint that bids would have to rise by three percent is less than compelling. For a compliant contractor, the additional cost would be foregone interest on a tax payment which, because of estimated tax return rules, should have required relatively quick payment in any case, the additional cost to contractors should have been negligible. Thus, costs would have only risen by three percent if virtually all of the contractors were avoiding or delaying payment of federal (and presumably state and local) income taxes. Similarly, the argument that the instances of abuse related to federal contracts does not seem persuasive; only federal contracts were studied, but there is no reason to believe that lack of compliance did not also exist for state and local contractors. Some of the other arguments appear to have merit. Legislation has already been introduced to rescind this provision.
The other major provision, enacted in 2003, prevented states from imposing premium taxes on the Medicare prescription drug insurance plans. In addition to this provision and the extension of the pension provision to partners, one other unfunded tax-related mandate, of small size, was added in the Pension Protection Act of 2006. This provision allowed fi rms to automatically enroll individuals in deferred retirement plans such as 401(k)s, preempting state laws that require written permission to deposit earnings in a retirement plan. This idea was supported by economic research indicating that individuals were more likely to participate in an employer retirement savings plan if the default was automatic sign up. Such a provision was included in the President's Advisory Panel tax reform proposals. One provision that appeared to involve a successful compromise among state governments and business, however, was a provision to tax mobile phones based on the primary place of use (2000) .
Several other smaller proposals prevented states from imposing fees and taxes, including ones on long-term-care insurance premiums of federal employees and retirees (2001), passenger facility fees (2000), Amtrak tickets (1997), and premiums for medical savings accounts (1997). Some were extraordinarily narrow: a provision preventing states from taxing individuals in the merchant marine who are operating in multiple waters but are not state residents (2000), a provision exempting payments from a fund established for the families of two offi cers killed in the U.S. Capitol from state gift taxes (1998), and a provision preventing taxation in the state with federal employees in Fort Campbell, and hydroelectric plants on the Columbia and Missouri rivers. These facilities border three states with no income tax-Tennessee, Washington, and South Dakota-and it seems likely that these provisions were aimed at reducing the tax burdens of these federal employees who live in states without income taxes. Finally, states were affected by a 2005 provision requiring states to conform to Internal Revenue Code Provisions involving bankruptcy, a 1999 provision imposing an excise tax on charitable recipients (which could include state and local entities) for certain abuses, a 1998 provision exempting certain native Alaskan land from property taxes (a provision that apparently mattered little since there was no state property tax and the land was not generally subject to local taxes), and the 1997 imposition of airline ticket taxes, which applied to state and local government purchases.
These provisions applied to a hodgepodge of issues, but with some constant themes: preventing states from imposing taxes on federal initiatives and dealing with multiple claimants to taxes. Most of these interventions have minor effects on state and local revenues, however.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of federal tax policy towards the states and localities reveal, as suggested by the title of this paper, both instances where federal policymakers are careful to preserve benefi ts for state and local governments and instances in which state concerns seem to be largely ignored. By and large, explicit subsidies for states and localities have been protected even when abuses have occurred, until those become so serious that action is required, as in the case of arbitrage bonds and private activity bonds. States continue to use general obligation bonds to engage in many activities that are essentially private in nature. Private activity bonds continue to make up a large share of federal income tax revenues lost due to interest exclusions. And, although the general sales tax deduction was eliminated in 1986, it was partially restored in 2004. That the restoration was viewed as a method of gaining votes from representatives of states without income taxes simply reinforces the importance of the states when explicit tax benefi ts are involved. Nor has the subsidy for state and local corporate income taxes been acknowledged, much less considered for reform.
Yet, at times, the concerns of state and local governments are given short shrift or apparently ignored entirely when the federal government is pursing other goals, including accommodating business interests, as in the case of restrictions on Internet fees, reducing the tax on dividends as a form of lowering the tax burden on corporate equity investment, dealing with abuses of government contractors, and favoring manufacturing fi rms through the production activities deduction. Nor has the federal government provided assistance in aiding the states in collecting their sales taxes on out-of-state vendors, although the states' hodgepodge of rules for taxable sales may be faulted in part for this outcome. In some of these cases, the implications for states were clearly discussed in the debate, but in others, they were virtually ignored.
If state and local governments are to protect their interests, a fi rst step is greater vigilance regarding issues under discussion at the federal level that do not appear to have a direct impact. Could the states have had an effect on the debate about the production activities deduction or the choice of dividend relief rather than a corporate rate reduction? Certainly in the case of the production activities deduction, tax professionals were criticizing the provisions as providing both economic distortions and administrative complexity. The House proposal was to enact a corporate rate reduction. Could another voice have made a difference? Had state and local governments protested the proposal to require withholding on payments to contractors when the Joint Committee on Taxation included the proposal in their options package, would the provision have been restricted to the federal government?
Future federal tax legislation could continue to affect the states and localities. Unless the AMT is to affect many millions of taxpayers, it must be addressed in 2007. If left alone, more taxpayers will no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes. States could, however, be even more affected by the proposal to fi nance the fi x of the AMT via a disallowance of state and local tax deductions, although history suggests that this is not likely to be the solution given the longstanding protection of these tax deductions. The resolution of the estate tax will also affect states. Moving to a consumption tax, as proposed in the Advisory Panels' plans, would cause a signifi cant problem for the states in both conformity and tax administration as depreciation deductions would be replaced with expensing. We judge it unlikely that a move to a consumption tax base, although championed by many, is likely, given the dramatic transitional costs (Gravelle, 2006) . Depending on which party has the political power, however, a move to further lower or eliminate taxes on dividends and capital gains seems a possibility that could increase state borrowing costs. Similarly, the administration continues to propose greatly expanding tax exempt savings accounts, which could compete directly with tax exempt bond preferences.
The current federal interest in reducing the tax gap (the difference between federal taxes owed and paid) could either harm or help states and localities. Improving income tax compliance for the federal government will also improve compliance for the states. At the same time, measures aimed at the tax gap could increase the three percent withholding level for contractors, which state and local governments opposed, and the Joint Committee on Taxation has suggested the option of requiring states to report property taxes to the IRS to increase compliance with itemized deductions. While this provision might be helpful to state and local income tax compliance, it would also impose an administrative burden on the states, with the net effects uncertain.
